Pay to Play Law Blog : Pay to Play Lawyer & Attorney : Bribery, Campaign Contributions

The language of Rule 206(4)-5 neither prohibits nor restricts investment advisors from contributing to federal candidates who presently hold no state or local office – only state "officials" from a "government entity" who have the power to directly or indirectly influence the outcome of the hiring of investment advisors (check out page 43 of the SEC's link above if you don’t believe me). As we, and others, have pointed out previously, this rule does not apply to contributions to sitting federal candidates or to private citizens running to replace those federal candidates. Likewise, the SEC's pay-to-play provisions place no restrictions on political donations from covered entities or individuals to state or municipal candidates who play no role in the direct or indirect oversight of public investment funds. Of course, state and local pay-to-play rules might still apply in certain circumstances – such as where a sitting state official is running for federal office, but there is no need (as a reaction to SEC pay-to-play regulations) to adopt caps that artificially restrict the ability of investment firm employees to engage in constitutionally-protected political speech.

Much the same error of interpretation can be seen in the MSRB pay-to-play context. Like their brethren in the investment advisory world, many municipal finance professionals covered by Rule G-37 erroneously believe that its provisions restrict political contributions to ALL candidates. This is simply not the case. Rule G-37's candidate contribution provisions only restrict donations to "official(s) of any issuer" who can directly or indirectly influence the hiring of a municipal securities professional, or donations to state officials or candidates who have the authority to appoint persons with such influence. The MSRB's regulatory framework does not prohibit contributions to federal candidates who hold no state or local office, nor does it bar contributions to private citizens turned federal candidates.  

Keeping these points mind, we hope that our readers working in the investment advisory and municipal finance arenas take a moment to examine their current political contribution policies, and ensure that they successfully protect their business development interests without unnecessarily curbing otherwise legitimate and beneficial political activities. On the other hand, it could be that the SEC and MSRB pay-to-play rules are simply an inoffensive way to say "thanks, but no thanks" to your friendly neighborhood federal candidate. Can’t do anything about that…

The CFTC was the first to show its holiday spirit in the form of a no-action letter addressing the pay-to-play rules applicable to swap dealers who conduct business with certain “governmental special entities”. The CFTC pay-to-play rules in Commission Regulation 23.451, which this blog previously covered in detail, restrict a swap dealer from engaging in certain activities with a “governmental special entity” if the swap dealer (or a covered associate of the swap dealer) made or solicited contributions to an official of that governmental special entity during the two preceding years. Such rules were meant to be in regulatory harmony with similar pay-to-play provisions promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). The DSIO, however, found them to be unnecessarily broader than their SEC and MSRB counterparts, particularly as they applied to political contributions associated with officials of federal or other non-state or non-local government agencies or instrumentalities.

As such, the DSIO issued its November no-action letter to provide swap dealers and their covered associates with relief from having to unnecessarily “expend significant resources to update their current policies and procedures to ensure compliance with Regulation 23.451’s prohibition” on contributions not otherwise covered by the SEC and/or MSRB rules. In its letter, the DSIO officially stated that “the Division will not recommend that the [CFTC] take an enforcement action against any [swap dealer] or covered associate of any [swap dealer] for failure to be fully compliant with Regulation 23.451” with respect to contributions not generally subject to restriction by the SEC and/or MSRB pay-to-play rules. 

By implementing this limitation, the DSIO appears to be making an effort to provide swap dealers with clarity regarding the scope of the CFTC’s pay-to-play provisions and likewise to harmonize such regulatory requirements with the statutory directives of the Dodd-Frank Act and other federal law. In this sense, the CFTC reprieve is both well meaning and a sensible policy decision. The reprieve offered by the D.C. Council, however, appears to be more the product of bureaucracy and delay than sensibility.

As such, on the other end of the naughty/nice list, we have the D.C. Council’s foot dragging on pay-to-play reform. As detailed in the pages of this blog over the course of the past year, various elected officials in the District of Columbia have been “hard at work” pushing comprehensive ethics and pay-to-play reform proposals in front of the D.C. Council. Back in March, Councilman Tommy Wells introduced a piece of legislation containing a collection of pay-to-play reforms for the District that had been previously ignored by the Council in 2011. Similarly, in September of this year, Mayor Vincent Gray presented his own proposal, drafted by D.C. Attorney General Irvin Nathan, which would seriously restrict the ability of major Washington vendors to make political contributions to any District official or candidate involved in influencing the award of a contract or grant by the municipal government.  Shortly thereafter, Councilman Jack Evans also introduced his own “pay-to-play” proposal that seeks to entirely remove the D.C. Council from the municipal contract-approval process. 

Despite the sound and fury associated with the introduction of these reform efforts, the council has yet to produce any results. In fact, none of these proposals has moved an inch in the D.C. Council’s legislative process, leaving many reform advocates wondering whether the push toward campaign finance and pay-to-play reform in the District is more about politicians seeking to score public relations points and less about serious legislative changes. As the Editorial Board of The Washington Post put it earlier this week:

            “[The fact] that the council didn’t have the time [to move forward on campaign finance and pay-to-play reform] – the excuse offered for inaction – speaks to a distressing lack of urgency in addressing this critical issue. Even more worrisome, it suggests a reluctance among those who benefit from the slack regulation of political dollars to fix a system that has helped perpetuate the District’s ‘pay-to-play’ culture.”

The excuse being referenced by the Post is a recent statement by D.C. Council Chairman Phil Mendelson indicating that no legislative progress will be made on campaign finance reform before the end of the Council’s yearly session. Similar comments have also been made by Councilwoman Muriel Bowser, the Chairwoman of the Government Operations Committee, who claimed that “most members [of the Council] … don’t want to rush” with regard to reform efforts. Can kicking at its best. 

Long story short… don’t expect pay-to-play changes in the District any time soon. Nevertheless, should the D.C. Council decide to take action in the new year, Pay-to-Play Law Blog will be right here keeping our readers up to date. 

By way of a quick refresher, the third-party solicitation ban, which officially went into effect on September 13, 2010, effectively prohibits SEC-registered investment advisers (and certain executives and employees of such advisers) from paying any third party for the solicitation of advisory business from any governmental entity unless the solicitor is an SEC-registered investment adviser, broker-dealer or municipal advisor. In the case of broker-dealers and municipal advisors, the ban also provides that any such solicitors must be subject to the pay-to-play restrictions that are purportedly due to be adopted  in the future by either the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) or the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MRSB).        

At the time of Rule 206(4)-5’s initial adoption by the SEC, the third-party solicitation ban’s compliance date was set for September 13, 2011, thus providing registrants with a so-called transition period in which to come into conformity with the rule. This transition period was intended to provide investment advisers and third-party solicitors with sufficient time to revise their compliance policies and procedures so as to prevent future regulatory violations. Likewise, the period was designed to provide an opportunity for FINRA and the MRSB to adopt analogous pay-to-play rules and for the Commission to assess how such rules would dovetail with Rule 206(4)-5’s provisions.

Due to delays in the adoption of a FINRA pay-to-play regulation and complications in the MSRB rulemaking process caused by various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC made the decision last summer to move the official third-party solicitation ban compliance deadline from September 13, 2011 to June 13, 2012. The additional nine months, the Commission posited, would provide registrants with sufficient time for an orderly transition under the rules. 

Fast forward to present day and the same justification is again being put forth by the SEC – this time to explain this month’s indeterminate extension of the compliance deadline. According to the SEC’s explanation in Release No. IA-3418, an orderly regulatory transition under the solicitation ban can only be accomplished through the extension of the present transition period beyond the Commission’s finalization of the new Dodd-Frank-imposed registration requirements for municipal advisor firms and subsequent to the MSRB’s re-introduction and implementation of its draft pay-to-play proposals.

What are we to make of this second round of “can kicking” on the part of the SEC? From a practical perspective, registered investment advisers and third-party solicitors now have additional time to bring their corporate compliance policies and procedures up to speed with SEC standards. The benefit of this additional time, however, is partially undone by the fact that the present compliance standards are not yet set and will not be set until the pending mishmash of regulations makes its way out of the SEC, FINRA and MSRB sausage grinders. 

From a policy and political perspective, the SEC’s action is equally as ambiguous. Do we take the SEC at its word and classify both compliance extensions as necessary steps to ease the transition of businesses into an unchartered regulatory environment? Or do we simply characterize the extensions as additional examples of the federal government “kicking the can down the road” when it comes to implementing difficult actions or decisions? 

Our most cynical readers likely view it as the later – patchwork political punting on the part of a governmental agency in a highly-charged election year. By contrast, our less-jaded readers may attach a more innocent explanation to the delays in implementation – after all, the SEC is forced to operate in conjunction with other entities in this instance. Whatever your particular take on the Commission’s action, however, Pay-to-Play Law Blog will be here to keep you updated and to help potential registrants understand their full compliance obligations moving forward.   

In a nutshell, CFTC Rule 23.451 prohibits a swap dealer from entering into a swap (or trading strategy involving a swap) with a governmental special entity for two years if the institution, one of its defined “covered associates”, or a Political Action Committee “controlled by the swap dealer” has made a contribution in excess of certain threshold amounts to an “official” of that governmental special entity in the preceding two years.

If you are a “swap dealer”, or think you might be one (and a number of “main street” banks are wrestling with that possibility now), this is a big deal. A single campaign contribution in excess of $150, if made by the wrong employee to the wrong candidate, will have the effect of debarring your entire financial institution from the derivative swap market for two full years.

“Sorry about that boss. Does this mean I can’t come to the Goldman Sachs Christmas Party this year?”

With draconian penalties like this, one would assume that the CFTC would go out of its way to define the specific “executive officers” the rule applies to or would provide some guidance whether an institution “controls” its PAC simply by covering its administrative expenses. One would be wrong. The regulated industry is on its own with the Sword of Damocles hanging perpetually over its head.

For now, pending further guidance from the CFTC between now and the October 15, 2012 effective date, the best one can do will be to look to guidance the SEC and MSRB provide with respect to their versions of pay-to-play regulation with respect to issues such as the definition of an “executive officer”, the nature of corporate compliance programs required, or the question of who “controls” of the corporate PAC.

The law of good intentions collides with the law of unintended consequences yet again. I’ll see some of you at the Christmas Party.

Two relevant reform proposals emerged in the wake of growing public outrage generated by CBS’ “Sixty Minutes” and other reports highlighting the ability of elected officials and their staff to trade on otherwise “non-public” information for personal investment gains. Near universal public outrage is about the only catalyst for Congressional action these days but, despite bipartisan grass-roots calls for reform, no singular solution is ever presented by Congress…. Instead, as many might have predicted, Congress produced two competing visions of what problems need to be addressed and how to go about it.

The Senate set forth its vision last Thursday when it passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (“STOCK”) Act of 2012 in a lopsided, 96-3 roll call vote. In addition to tackling the fundamental problem not so subtly referenced in its title, the STOCK Act seeks to implement a number of aggressive ethics rules and revisions to the Lobbying Disclosure Act aimed at further restricting legislative and executive branch conflicts of interest and mandating more transparency in the area of non-lobbyist political consulting. 

Most significantly for “Establishment Washington”, included within the Senate proposal’s ban on “insider trading” is a controversial obligation that all “political intelligence” consultants register and disclose their activities as if they were federal lobbyists, and a contentious legislative fix to the poorly-written “honest services fraud” statute that was recently-deemed unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in contexts outside of bribery and kickback schemes. 

The language of the Senate bill would reach individuals and entities who engage in “political intelligence contacts” for the purpose of obtaining information from officials of the executive and legislative branches of government “for use in analyzing securities or commodities markets, or in informing investment decisions.” Any organization employing or retaining an individual who engages in one such contact would be required to register and report in the same fashion as if they were a lobbyist-registrant under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA).  As such, they would be subject to the same quarterly and semi-annual disclosure requirements that lobbyist-registrants currently meet.

On a quarterly basis, via a Form LD-2, “political intelligence” registrants would need to disclose the “issue areas” their organizations are discussing, the legislative body or federal agencies they are contacting, the employee(s)/consultant(s) that engage in such contacts, and the total expenses incurred with regard to the intelligence-gathering activities. On a semi-annual basis, via a Form LD-203, political intelligence registrants would also need to disclose political contributions and contributions to events honoring or recognizing covered executive or legislative branch officials. Such contribution reports would be required of both individual consultants and their employing organizations, effectively opening up a new segment of the Washington political class to public scrutiny of its campaign and non-campaign donations. Certain limited exemptions to these disclosure requirements do exist under the Senate version of the bill, but they are not nearly as broad as those carved out under the LDA for current lobbyist-registrants.

Reform and transparency are all well and good, but these requirements proved too much for the House (and legions of the suddenly activated “political intelligencia”) to accept.

Yesterday morning, the House followed the Senate’s lead by passing its own amended version of the STOCK Act by a similarly enormous voting margin – 417 to 2 to be exact – but without the requirement that non-lobbyist “political intelligence” consultants register and report their activities. Likewise, the House version of the bill refrains from amending the honest services fraud statute to allow for its use in non-bribery and non-kickback scenarios. 

House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) articulated the House rationale when he commented that the Senate’s disclosure requirements were something “outside of what we do” and that they were not part of the original purpose of the STOCK Act legislation. Also criticized was the “vagueness” of the political intelligence provisions as pertains to anything that happens in Washington.

Thus, in as sure an effort towards “assisted suicide” as Congress has in its arsenal these days, the amended House STOCK Act calls for a federal study of the “political intelligence” industry for the purpose of making future legislative recommendations and additionally prohibits lawmakers from receiving access to initial public offerings of stock. THAT always results in action, right?

Looking to the future, many believe that the political intelligence requirements of the Senate’s STOCK Act are yet another reformulation of recent efforts attempting to compel increased disclosure, and thus disincentivize, political spending by corporations and wealthy individuals. This blog has discussed similar efforts by the SEC, Congress, the ABA, and the Obama Administration in the past. And as such, it is easy to understand the negative reaction that has come from these House Members and many on K Street. Particularly when coupled with the drastic effect the expansion of registration and reporting requirements would have on business activities in and around Washington, D.C moving forward.

In the end, it will be interesting to see whether the overarching goal of banning “insider trading” by Members of Congress and congressional staff becomes collateral damage in the battle over establishing political intelligence registration and reporting requirements. Stranger things have happened on Capitol Hill. Anyone selling information or access in Washington needs to be closely watching Congress in the coming weeks to see how this tug of war ends. 

But you already know that.

Our latest contestants in this Sisyphean legal drama are a united band of like-minded law school professors looking to utilize the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a vehicle to counter the perceived negative impact of Citizens United. It appears this group has concluded that the imposing moniker “Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending” (the “Committee”) sounds more authoritative than “a united band of like-minded law school professors”. I think I agree with them on that. 

Under either moniker, this group has filed a petition for rulemaking with the SEC requesting draft regulations that require public companies to disclose to shareholders information regarding the use of corporate resources for political activities. The main gist of its petition – stricter SEC disclosure rules are necessary to ensure that corporate political activities are subject to the appropriate level of shareholder scrutiny in the wake of Citizen’s United. The Committee bases this conclusion on the following contentions:

First, it asserts that there is strong data indicating that public investors have become increasingly interested in receiving information about corporate political spending. To support this statement, the like-minded professors reference a 2006 Mason-Dixon poll indicating that 85% of shareholder respondents held that “there is a lack of transparency surrounding corporate political activity.” They also make note of a FactSet Research Systems analysis that indicates 50 out of 465 shareholder proposals appearing on public-company proxy statements in 2011 involved political spending issues.

Second, the Committee grounds its request in the belief that there is increasing momentum toward political spending transparency in the corporate community, as evidenced by the growing number of large public companies that have voluntarily adopted policies requiring disclosure of their political expenditures. To this point, and perhaps undercutting the urgency of their call to action, the professors highlight a study by the Center for Political Accountability indicating that nearly 60% of S&P 500 companies voluntarily provide shareholders with information regarding corporate spending on political activities.

Third and finally, the Committee bases its request on the idea that stricter SEC regulation of corporate political disclosure will lead to better corporate oversight and accountability mechanisms. At present, the professors assert, shareholders are unable to hold directors and officers accountable when they spend corporate funds on politics in a way that departs from the interests of the company. From the Committee’s point of view, this is due to the fact that public information regarding corporate political activity is out of the average shareholder’s reach (because it is either dispersed among too many regulatory bodies or not gathered at all). By requiring companies to disclose to one central entity (the SEC), it is the professors contention that there will be better information available to shareholders, and in turn, a subsequent improvement in corporate accountability.

Based upon these assertions, the Committee’s petition recommends that the SEC initiate a rulemaking project to adopt a series of regulations that mandate periodic disclosure of corporate political spending. Whether the SEC will take heed of the Committee’s request remains to be seen, but the petition itself has already begun to draw a mix of criticism and support from members of the business, legal, and academic communities.

For example, just a few days after the Committee’s petition was submitted, Keith Paul Bishop – the former California Commissioner of Corporations and an adjunct professor at the Chapman University School of Law – filed a response letter with the SEC refuting the professors’ contentions and requesting that no such rulemaking project be initiated by the Commission. In his response, Bishop contends that the Committee’s proposal will only add to the already extensive public disclosure burden faced by reporting companies and that it is unnecessary in light of the growing trend toward voluntary corporate disclosure. He also argues that it is not the role of the SEC to mandate corporate expenditure on public disclosure of political activity when statistics show that not even a third of 2011 proxy proposals on the subject enjoyed shareholder support.

In contrast, official comments filed by Mark Latham, founder of VoterMedia.org, and executives from the International Corporate Governance Network expressed strong support for the Committee’s request. Specifically, both comments revealed a common respect for the Committee’s belief that the disclosure of corporate political spending is necessary to help stave off abuse or the breach of business ethics by officers and directors.

The debate over who has the better side of the argument will rage on in the coming months as the SEC weighs the proposal and determines whether to take any action. One would have to expect the Obama Administration to lend its support to the Committee’s cause in it’s typical “no fingerprints here, I don’t know what you’re talking about” approach. The response from the corporate community will undoubtedly be more mixed and more direct, but it will be interesting to see what reaction emerges from groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and The Conference Board’s newly formed Committee on Corporate Political Spending (to which, BIAS ALERT, I am an advisor). Stay tuned….

Under these new pay to play rules, securities-based swap dealers and their “covered associates” would specifically be barred from engaging in swap transactions with a “municipal entity” for a two-year period if they choose to make certain types of political contributions to officials of that municipal entity. This Proposed Rule 15Fh-6 is modeled on, and intended to complement, existing restrictions on pay to play practices under Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-5, which imposes restrictions on political contributions by investment advisers providing or seeking to provide investment advisory services to public pension plans and other government investors, and MSRB Rules G-37 and G-38, which impose such restrictions on municipal securities dealers and broker-dealers engaging or seeking to engage in the municipal securities business. The pay to play restrictions are also similar to rules the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) recently proposed for non-securities-based swaps.

According to SEC Chairwoman Mary L. Schapiro, these new pay to play provisions and the other business conduct standards in the proposed rules will work to “level the playing field in the securities-based swap market by bringing needed transparency to this market and by seeking to ensure that customers in these transactions are treated fairly.” That is yet to be seen, but all five SEC commissioners nevertheless voted unanimously to propose the rules and introduce them through formal public notice. The proposed rules will remain open for public comment until August 29, at which point the SEC will take any submitted remarks under advisement and make a final vote as to their implementation.

It will be interesting to see how business leaders and public officials alike react to the SEC’s proposal during the upcoming notice and comment period. Businesses, and in particular investment firms, have had to adjust to a litany of newly proposed regulations and pay to pay rules in the wake of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. As such, it has left companies universally unsure as to what types of activities are permitted and prohibited in their day-to-day business. Public officials, however, have been quick to applaud any and all efforts by the federal government and its numerous business regulatory bodies to restrain “unsavory” corporate practices – practices that the SEC, MSRB, CFTC, and other entities assert have contributed to the current economic downturn and led to the misappropriation of billions upon billions of dollars in taxpayer money. Over the next few months, we shall see if both trends continue and if the movement toward increased federal regulation of business conduct and political speech persists.

The Proposed Interpretation provides guidance on factors that may result in a PAC being treated as a dealer-controlled PAC for purposes of Rule G-37. Rule G-37 provides that certain contributions to elected officials of municipal securities issuers made by dealers, MFPs associated with dealers, and PACs controlled by dealers and their MFPs (“dealer-controlled PACs”) may result in prohibitions on the dealers from engaging in municipal securities business with such issuers for a period of two years from the date of any triggering contributions. A dealer or MFP involved in the creation of a PAC would be viewed as controlling it. The dealer must also consider whether payments made by it or its MFPs to a PAC could be viewed as an indirect contribution.

The MSRB seeks industry comment through October 29 on whether to require dealers to disclose the names of affiliated PACs to the MSRB for public scrutiny. Such information would be posted on the MSRB web site.

JUSTIFIED BY PAST ABUSES

The Commission justified its approval of the new rule by referencing the perceived past success of MSRB rule G-37: “Our years of experience with MSRB rule G-37 suggests that the ‘strong medicine’ provided by that rule has both significantly curbed participation in pay to play and provides a reasonable cooling off period to mitigate the effect of a political contribution.” The Commission further rationalized the need for a tough federal rule based on its belief that neither “codes of ethics [nor] compliance procedures alone would be adequate to stop pay to play practices, particularly when the advisor or senior officers of the advisor are involved...” Under the rule, investment advisers remain obligated to adopt policies and procedures designed to prevent violation of the rule. The Commission affirmed “that an adviser’s implementation of a strong compliance program will reduce the likelihood, and therefore costs, of inadvertent violations.”

ANTICIPATING A FIRST AMENDMENT LEGAL CHALLENGE?

In the discussion portion of the rule, the Commission addressed comment letters and also tackled First Amendment concerns, explaining that the new rule is closely drawn to accomplish the goal of preventing quid pro quo arrangements while avoiding unnecessary burdens on the protected speech and association rights of investment advisers. The Commission pointed out “…the rule imposes no restrictions on activities such as making independent expenditures to express support for candidates, volunteering, making speeches, and other conduct.” The Commission distinguished the recent Citizens United Case, by stating: “Citizens United deals with certain independent expenditures (rather than contributions to candidates), which are not implicated by our rule.”

PLACEMENT AGENTS ARE NOT BANNED BUT SUBJECT TO FINRA REGULATION

The Commission, persuaded by comment letters, retreated from an outright ban on investment advisers hiring so-called placement agents. As outlined above, the regulations approved allow advisors to continue hiring placement agents provided those agents are registered with the SEC or the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and subject to pay-to-play restrictions. The restriction on investment advisers using unregistered placement agents will not take effect for one year, in part to give FINRA, which has experience enforcing the MSRB rules, time to propose such rules. Andrew Donohue, who heads the SEC division of investment management, said that the FINRA regulations will be “at least as stringent” as his agency’s rules. Nevertheless, SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro warned in an open meeting Wednesday that if the SEC finds any signs of abuse of the new rule, it may still consider an outright ban. “If the Commission determines that third-party placement agents continue to inappropriately influence the selection of investment advisers for government clients even under our enhanced rule, I expect we would consider the imposition of a full ban,” said Schapiro.

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS PERMITTED - BUT HAVE AN ACCEPTED PAY TO PLAY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM IN PLACE

The Commission also attempted to temper the rule by providing certain exceptions to the prohibition on contributions. Contributions of $350 or less per election per candidate can be ignored “de minimus” if the contributor is entitled to vote for the recipient and contributions of $150 or less per election per candidate are permitted even if the contributor is not entitled to vote for the candidate. In addition, an adviser may apply to the Commission for an order exempting it from the two-year compensation ban. The SEC emphasized that a key factor in determining whether to exempt a firm in circumstances in which a violation occurs will be whether the firm has adopted and implemented an adequate pay to play compliance program.  As the Commission noted: “While we have designed the rule to reduce its impact, investment advisers are best positioned to protect these clients by developing and enforcing robust compliance programs designed to prevent contributions from triggering the two-year time out.”

The effective date of the new rule will be 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register. As noted above, investment advisers may no longer use third parties to solicit government business except in compliance with the rule on one year after the Effective Date. Advisers may need to continue to provide advice for a reasonable period of time during which a client can seek to obtain advisory services from others. While some commentators urged the Commission to allow advisers to continue to receive fees during the two year time out for services provided pursuant to existing contracts, the Commission responded: “Allowing contracts acquired as a result of political contributions to continue uninterrupted would eviscerate the rule.”

The financial industry remains in the early stages of evaluating the impact this new federal pay to play rule will have on its activities. One thing we all know for certain, federal regulation of pay to play is here to stay.

The SEC report was issued in connection with an Enforcement Division inquiry into whether JP Morgan Securities Inc. (JPMSI) violated MSRB Rule G-37. JPMSI underwrote municipal bonds issued by the state of California within two years after the Vice Chairman of JPMSI’s parent bank holding company, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Inc. (JP Morgan Chase), who also led JP Morgan Chase’s investment banking business, gave a $1,000 contribution to the Treasurer of the State of California. As quoted from the report: “On September 10, 2002, the Vice Chairman forwarded an invitation for the California Treasurer’s New York fundraising event to JP Morgan Chase’s executive committee and to its Vice President for Government Relations with a handwritten note stating that the California Treasurer is an important client and soliciting their help in raising $10,000 for the event.” Although the Vice Chairman of JP Morgan Chase was not a director, officer or employee of JPMSI, the Commission found he nevertheless was an MFP associated with JPMSI because he functionally supervised JPMSI and served on the executive committee that oversaw JPMSI.

One commentator observed of the JPMSI investigation: “That is exactly the sort of behavior that the SEC wants to prohibit with MSRB Rule G-37 and its proposed pay to play rule.” The SEC merely said its report should serve as a “warning” about mixing political donations and state banking business.

The SEC report serves to remind the financial community that placing an executive who supervises the activities of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer outside of the corporate governance structure of such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer does not prevent the application of MSRB Rule G-37 to that individual’s conduct. “Firms cannot rely solely upon…organizational charts in determining whether a person is subject to those rules,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. The SEC will look to the activities, not merely the title, of an associated person in determining whether the person is subject to the pay-to-play restrictions. A key takeaway from this report is that pay-to-play remains a key focus of the SEC and the SEC is continuing to increase its involvement with respect to pay-to-play issues.